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In this paper we analyze the effects of changing market structure on price dynamics 
of final goods in the emerging Czech retail market. We estimate the extent of 
upstream and downstream market power and find that changing market structure was 
responsible for an average yearly decrease in the prices of retailed products of 0.8 
p.p. during 2000–2005. At the same time, however, we anticipate that the already 
started period of mergers and acquisitions could cause yearly increases in the prices 
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Nontechnical Summary 
One of the most apparent changes in the Czech Republic (one of the transition countries in Central 
and Eastern Europe) – one that daily influences every single inhabitant – is the change in the way 
people do shopping. At the start of the transition from a command to a market economy, there 
were chains of isolated small shops. Now, 15 years later, a small number of large retailers operate 
in extensive shopping centers. This development poses the question of to what extent has such a 
significant and quick transformation of the retail market structure affected the prices of retailed 
products.  
The available empirical evidence on the price effects due to changing market structure is much 
more often in favor of the hypothesis that concentration causes price increases. There is however, 
no evidence so far for transition countries. In this original study, the price effects of changing 
market structure on retailed products are evaluated by means of the size of the downstream and 
upstream market power of retailers during 2000–2005 in the Czech Republic.  
Our findings suggest that downstream market power was dominated by upstream market power 
and thus prices of retailed products declined, on average by 0.8 p.p. a year (2000–2005). At the 
same time, the tendency toward mergers and acquisitions among retail chains, which had already 
started in 2004, gradually leading toward a more standard ratio of number of retailers to market 
size – as observed in Western countries, would cause average extra inflation of retail prices of 1.2 
p.p. (approximately 0.5 p.p. in the CPI) a year over the next ten years.     The Price Effects of an Emerging Retail Market    3 
 
1. Introduction 
The change in political and economical life in emerging markets, and especially in the transition 
economies of Central and Eastern Europe, can be observed in a variety of aspects. One of the 
most apparent, and one that daily influences the life of every single inhabitant, is the change in the 
way people shop. At the start of the transition from a command to a market economy, there were 
chains of isolated small shops. Now, 15 years later, large retailers operate in extensive shopping 
centers.
1 The key question analyzed in this paper is to what extent has such a significant and quick 
transformation of the retail market structure affected the prices of retailed products.     
A by-product of this qualitative change in shopping patterns has been a significant concentration 
of the retail market into the hands of just a few retail chains.
2 For instance, in the Czech Republic 
retail chains served 7% of the retail goods market (7 chains) in 1993, but by 2005 the figure had 
reached 63% (the top 10 chains). The changing market structure was characterized by entries 
between 1990 and 2001 and exits starting from 2004, thus obeying the theory of shakeouts first 
described by Hopenhayn (1992) and further developed by Horvath et al. (2001) and Thompson 
and Pintea (2007). Moreover, since concentration is also a phenomenon of the retail business 
world-wide, it will probably further increase in the emerging markets as well.  
For instance, the largest retail chain in the world, Wal-Mart, expanded its market share in North 
America, Asia, and Europe in the 1990s by taking over other retail chains (for instance Wertkauf 
in Germany) and has become the 8
th biggest company in the world, according to the periodical 
survey Top 500 Global Companies conducted by the Financial Times (2006). In Europe, retail 
mergers and acquisitions took place frequently in the 1990s. According to a study by Dobson 
Consulting (1999), during 1992–1996 the frequency of mergers was between 1 and 5 per year, but 
in 1997 and 1998 it increased to 17 and 16, respectively. Consequently, the concentration within 
the industry increased all over the world during the 1990s. Over three years, the average of the top 
five firms’ national market share in Europe increased by 5% to 53% in 1996. Since the tendency 
toward mergers and acquisitions has continued even after 1996, one can expect the current 
concentration ratios to be even higher. 
As regards the future trend, the company Planet Retail (2007) made a prediction of the regional 
market shares of the top 10 retailers for 2008. According to this study, the concentration in 
Western Europe in 2003 was 41.5% and is projected to stagnate around 43% in 2008. By contrast, 
in Central and Eastern Europe the concentration is expected to increase more significantly, from 
24% in 2003 to 32.6% in 2008.  
Since significant concentration patterns may have effects on the prices of retailed products, the 
relation between greater concentration and prices of retailed products has already attracted wide 
attention from researchers in Western countries. Lamm (1981) was one of the first to examine the 
relationship between concentration and prices. He used aggregate price level data in local markets 
                                                           
1 The frequency of opening of new large retail centers has been so high that it gave rise in the Czech Republic to 
a film entitled “Czech Dream” (by Klusák and Remunda, 2004), where the opening of a fake supermarket is 
advertised and a large group of customers come to shop, albeit in vain.     
2 A retail chain (primarily grocery oriented) is characterized by a range of retail outlets which share a brand and 
central management, typically with standardized business methods and practices, and retailing primarily grocery 
products.  4   Jiří Podpiera and Marie Raková 
 
(districts) in the USA and found a positive relationship between concentration and prices.
3 Barros 
et al. (2004) used Portuguese food price data for approximately 200 products, which were bundled 
into price indices and calculated for a set of stores located in every district of the Portuguese 
mainland. Their estimates showed that the concentration effect on prices depends on how the cost 
reductions are reflected in insiders’ prices, i.e., on the pass-through rate. They concluded that a 
merger most probably increases consumer prices. Smith (2004) analyzed profit margins for each 
chain in the UK, a survey of consumer choices, and a data set of store characteristics. He 
concluded that a merger between the largest firms led to price increases of up to 7.4%. Further, 
Asplund and Friberg (2002) examined retail grocery price levels across a large panel of stores in 
Sweden. They explained the price variation across stores by market structure variables to capture 
differences in competition intensity and a number of store- and region-specific factors. They used 
food price data for roughly 30 items across approximately 1,000 stores across Sweden and found 
that most of the explained variation in prices can be attributed to store-specific factors such as size 
and chain affiliation. Also, Setala (2000) explored the main purpose of large grocery retail 
mergers and found on data for Finland that the main purpose is to gain market power and not 
efficiency.  
Even though the available empirical evidence predominantly suggests a positive relation between 
concentration and price increases, the relation in an emerging retail market will be a result of 
downstream (in relation to the consumer) and upstream (in relation to the supplier) market power 
practices being affected by the changing retail market structure. Namely, if there is limited or no 
market power executed upstream, concentration in the retail market will lead to an increase in 
prices for the final consumer. However, if the upstream market power channel is active and 
significant, concentration might not actually result in price increases (and might eventually lead to 
a temporary price decline). This is due to the fact that despite an increase in mark-up due to 
concentration, input prices might be lowered by upstream market power. Thus, the effects the 
changing market structure has on prices of retailed products are unpredictable ex ante.   
Therefore, in this paper we evaluate the effects of downstream and upstream retail chain market 
power in the emerging Czech retail market and estimate the price effects connected with the retail 
chain expansion period 2000–2005 (a period characterized by a stabilized number of retail chains 
expanding their market share at the expense of other traditional shopkeepers). Based on our 
estimates, we then speculate about the effects on prices stemming from the recent tendency 
toward mergers and acquisitions.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some facts about the Czech retail 
market and Section 3 introduces the tested hypothesis. Section 4 describes the data sample and 
Section 5 presents the estimation results. Section 6 concludes.  
                                                           
3 A recent study by Newmark (1990) finds an insignificant effect of concentration on prices of a narrowly 
specified index of the 35 most commonly purchased products across 14 U.S. cities in the late 1980s. The Price Effects of an Emerging Retail Market   5 
 
2. Some Facts about the Czech Retailing Industry 
There was not a single international retail chain operating in the Czech Republic at the time of the 
Velvet Revolution in 1989. Under socialism, food products had been retailed in small communal 
stores called Jednota and Pramen. After the revolution, foreign retail chains started to enter the 
Czech Republic quite quickly, either by acquiring existing retail spaces or by building brand-new 
stores. The first foreign retail chain was Billa, which entered in 1990. The next four chains 
entered in 1991: Julius Meinl, Delvita, Plus, and Ahold (Ahold operates Albert supermarkets and 
Hypernova hypermarkets). During the late 1990s, six more chains entered: Spar, Tesco, 
Carrefour, Globus, Penny Market, and Kaufland. And finally, in 2000 the discount chain Lidl and 
in 2001 the hypermarket chain Makro started to operate. Thus, there were 13 retail chains 
operating in the Czech Republic in 2001 (see Table 1). 
Table 1: Chronology of Retailer’s Entry 
 
Name of retail chain Entry date
Billa, spol. s r.o. November 9, 1990
Julius Meinl, a.s. May 31, 1991
Delvita, a.s. June 3, 1991
Plus Discount, spol. s r.o. August 5, 1991
Ahold Czech Republic, a.s. October 16, 1991
CS Edeka s.r.o. December 31, 1991
Spar Invest CZ, s.r.o., group member of Spar March 17, 1992
Tesco Stores Czech Republic, a.s. March 23, 1992
Carrefour Czech Republic, s.r.o. December 12, 1994
Globus Czech Republic, k.s. July 27, 1995
Penny Market, s.r.o. January 25, 1996
Kaufland Czech Republic, v.o.s. March 10, 1997
Lidl Czech Republic, v.o.s. June 5, 2000
Makro Cash & Carry Czech Republic, s.r.o. June 1, 2001
SD b M
 
Source: Database Magnus. 
 
By Western standards, the number of active retail chains appears quite excessive. For instance, in 
Austria, where the market is similar, there are three chains. In Germany, where the retail market is 
approximately eight times larger, there are 11 retail chains. This observation would suggest that 
the formation of the retail business is far from finished. 
The retail chains struggled to acquire market share, and in 2004 those that had not established a 
sufficient position in the market started leaving. Julius Meinl was the first chain to exit the market, 
followed by Carrefour, Edeka, Delvita, and Plus Discount (in 2008). Their stores were taken over 
by other retail chains (Julius Meinl was sold to Ahold, Edeka and Carrefour to Tesco, and Delvita 
and Plus Discount to Billa/Rewe Group). Thus, the market is consolidating and the concentration 
in food retailing has increased further since 2000. In 2006, the top 10 retailers supplied 63% of the 
retail market – see Incoma Research (2007). This means an increase of 22% since 2000 (see 
Figure 1 below). 
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Source: Incoma Research. 
According to Euromonitor (2007) the Czech grocery retail network is characterized by dynamic 
expansion of discount stores and hypermarkets. According to Euromonitor’s data, there were only 
94 hypermarkets at the end of 2000, but the number had grown to nearly 180 by 2005. The 
number of discount stores nearly doubled as well: from 250 in 2000 to 476 in 2005. According to 
Incoma Research (2007), most people do their monthly spending in hypermarkets (nearly 40% of 
all shoppers), followed by discount stores (around 23%). On the contrary, shopping in small shops 
and supermarkets is on a declining trend (see Figure 2). The failure of Delvita, which operated 
primarily supermarkets, is obviously a result of the declining demand (sentiment) for shopping in 
supermarkets.  
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Source: Incoma Research. 
Consolidation is also taking place through cooperation between the fragmented stores of the 
former Jednota in small towns. Their “cooperative association”, established in 2007, is benefiting 
from united bargaining power and a single marketing policy. It will operate under the COOP 
brand and will consist of 3,000 stores. In 2006, CZK 26 billion was spent in COOP supermarkets, 
which would rank it in fifth place among the retail chains. The Price Effects of an Emerging Retail Market   7 
 
3. Testing for Downstream and Upstream Market Power  
We consider a retail chain that faces its residual demand function in the retail market. At the same 
time, we assume that it resells products purchased from suppliers and possibly also produces its 
own products for sale.   
A representative consumer has utility u(Q) from consuming a composite basket Q. The demand 
for the products of supermarket i is given by the results of the consumers’ utility maximization 
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where P denotes the aggregate price index of the corresponding basket of retailed products,  i p  is 
the price charged for a composite good by retailer i, and ni is the number of stores of the retail 
chain i. The retail chain maximizes its profit and thus solves:  
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where C(.) is the cost function. After substituting for prices from the demand equation, we get: 
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Starting with the cost function, it is assumed that the marginal cost increases with the quantity 
retailed (purchased by the retailer and resold) and that the marginal cost curve is shifted by the 
effect of the number of shops in the retail chain. This shift is likely to be negatively related to the 
number of retail shops, as, in general, a product that is offered in a larger chain of retail shops is 
better established in the market and thus the retailer can get a discount from its suppliers, i.e., it 
executes upstream market power. 
From the downstream market power point of view, it is market share that is at stake. The retailer 
can pass part of the benefit gained from its upstream power to customers in order to gain greater 
market share. Consequently, the effect of an increase in the number of stores within a retail chain 
may decrease the prices of the retailer’s products. At the same time, however, an increase in a 
retailer’s market share creates market power downstream and thus leads to a premium mark-up. 
An increase in mark-up due to an increase in a retailer’s market share might lead to an increase in 
prices of retailed products after the upstream power is exhausted.   8   Jiří Podpiera and Marie Raková 
 
3.1 Downstream Market Power 
In order to test the relation between market structure and price dynamics in the retail sector, we 
perform a panel regression in which the retail chains are observed over time. In particular, we test 
the effect of changing market share and number of retail shops in a chain (as a proxy for market 
structure) on prices for final consumers, while we keep the prices of purchased products, wages, 
and material inputs unchanged. In formal terms we can write: 
        lnPi,t  = αi + ∑ =
n
j t j i j C
1 , , ln β + γ ln(MKTSi,t)+ δln(Ni,t)+ εi,t   (3.1.1) 
The dependent variable is the change in the price of the composite good sold by the retailer i, i.e., 
lnPi,t, and is regressed on the input price lnCi,j,t (where j stands for wages, the price of material 
inputs, and the price of products purchased for retail),  on the market share of the retailer 
ln(MKTSi,t), and on the number of stores of the retailer ln(Ni,t). The random error εi,t is i.i.d.  
If volume data were used to estimate 3.1.1, due to the availability of volume data (revenues and 
costs), i.e., ln(Pi,tQi,t) and ln(Ci,j,tQi,t) instead of lnPi,t and lnCi,j,t, the error term εt would contain, in 
addition to a random error, a term (∑ =
n
j j 1β -1)lnQi,t. It follows that if ∑ =
n
j j 1β  were not different 
from unity, then the volume and price data would yield the same results (and γ and δ would equal 
zero). However, this holds only in the case of perfect competition, which is unlikely for the retail 
business, since the retail market is presumably closer to monopolistic competition. Thus 
∑ =
n
j j 1β < 1 and the remaining volatility in prices is due to changing market power under 
imperfect competition.  
Nevertheless, if one assumes that the sales volume responds with the same elasticity to changes in 
the relative prices of retailed goods as well as to changes in the retailer’s real market share, we 
can consistently estimate parameters in a volume equation of the following form: 
 
                  ln(Pi,tQi,t)   = αi + ∑ =
n
j t i t j i j v Q C
1 , , , , ) ln( β  + γ ln(NMKTSi,t)+ δln(Ni,t)+ εi,t                            (3.1.2) 
 
where ln(NMKTSi,t) represents the nominal market share of retailer i at time t.
4  
 
In other words, the results derived using volume data are equivalent to the price data (relation 
3.1.2 would hold for an arbitrary quantity), conditional on the sum of the elasticity to cost 
volumes and nominal market share not being different from unity. This can be formally tested by:  
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, = , where PtQt stands for total sales of retailed products in the market. The Price Effects of an Emerging Retail Market   9 
 
If  ∑ = − =
n
j j 1 , 1 ν β γ , then (∑ = + −
n
j j 1 , 1 γ βν )lnQi,t = 0. Thus, the equivalence between (3.1.2) and 
(3.1.1) holds. 
From the regression (3.1.2), we can further obtain the sum of the parameters j β , i.e., 
 
1 2




j j β β .                     (3.1.4) 
The statistic (3.1.4) indicates the type of competition in the sense of the Rosse-Panzar model 
(Panzar and Rosse, 1987), since it represents the sum of the elasticity of the output price to input 
prices – more precisely the elasticity of the output price to the average input price.  
Apart from the elasticity of the output price to input prices, the regression relation (3.1.2) contains 
additional terms. The intercept represents a premium (constant part of the mark-up) associated 
with fixed specific characteristics of the particular retailer chain. Among these specifics we might 
recognize the style of presenting goods, other qualities of services, and exclusivity of location of 
the retail stores. Furthermore, however, the mark-up is also determined by the market structure, 
i.e., the number of retail stores and the market share of a monopolistic retailer.  
Whereas an increase in market share is likely to lead to strengthening downstream market power 
and to a rise in the retail mark-up and consequently to an increase in the prices of retailed goods 
( 0 > γ ), an increase in the number of retail stores within one chain might have an ambiguous 
effect on the prices of final goods, as it is simultaneously a source of upstream market power.  
3.2 Upstream Market Power 
A retail chain operates in three markets for inputs. Two markets (labor and material inputs) are 
generally quite competitive and thus the retail chain is a price taker there. However, the third 
market (wholesale) is obviously imperfectly competitive, because the demand for wholesale is 
covered mostly by the retail chains themselves, which are large and limited in number, and so this 
naturally creates an opportunity for the utilization of upstream market power. Therefore, the costs 
of products purchased by the retail chain would be determined as follows:   
 
  ln(Ci,tQi,t) =ωi +  θln(SIZEi,t) + φln(NMKTSi,t) + ψln(ERt) + χln(Ni,t)+ξi,t                       (3.2.1) 
where Ci,tQi,t denotes the costs of products purchased for resale in retail chain i, ωi labels the retail 
chain specific pseudo-price elasticity, ln(SIZEi,t) = ln(Pi,tQi,t) – ln(Ni,t), Ni,t denotes the number of 
stores, and NMKTSi,t is the nominal market share of retail chain i. ERt denotes the exchange rate, 
whose inclusion is justified by the fact that approximately 30–40% of retailed products are 
imported. The letter ξi,t denotes the disturbance term, which is i.i.d.    
The logic of the regression relation (3.2.1) is based on the intention to analyze the effects of 
market structure (upstream market power) on the price of products purchased for retailing, 
conditional on the final consumer price and the quantity of retailed goods. The conditionality can 
be inferred from the variable SIZEi,t, since it is constructed from the revenues of the retailer. In 
addition, since we propose to include in the regression a separate variable Ni,t, the effect of the 10   Jiří Podpiera and Marie Raková 
 
number of stores of the retailer is equal to χ – θ, and is expected to be negative, since the retailer 
is exercising upstream market power.  
Also, an increasing sales volume Pi,tQi,t will have an impact on the costs of purchased products 
Ci,tQi,t. This is a result of price re-negotiation: a higher quantity sold could imply either a request 
for a decrease in the price of purchased products – the market power of the retailer – or vice versa 
the classical demand effect: an increase in price due to increased demand for the product. In fact, 
one might expect that an increase in quantity sold would rather lead to an increase in the price of 
purchased products, since the negotiating power of the producer increases with increasing 
demand. The dominating direction and extent of this mechanism can be inferred from the 
summation of the coefficients φ and θ. At the same time, however, decreasing nominal market 
share due to a growing reference market leads to a decrease in the price of purchased products by 
φ. 
And finally, since a significant proportion of the retailed products are traded internationally, the 
price of purchased products could be influenced by fluctuations in the exchange rate. This effect 
can be measured by the parameter ψ. 
4. Data Description  
The entire dataset was downloaded from a single data source, the Magnus database. Magnus 
contains data at annual frequency for financial statements, number of stores, and number of 
employees of Czech companies and companies operating in the Czech Republic. We thus work 
with the entire set of retail chains, as listed in Table 1, except for Edeka owing to its small 
revenues (CZK 1.5 billion in 2002), focusing on a specific region (close to the German border). 
The data forms an unbalanced panel over 2000–2005 for 13 retail chains. The average number of 
observations is 4.2, with a minimum and maximum of 2 and 6, respectively. The selected period 
2000–2005 is characterized by a stabilized number of retail chains expanding their market share at 
the expense of other traditional shopkeepers.   
Table 2 below displays basic data descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis.  
Table 2: Data Descriptive Statistics 
Mean Std. Max/Min
Revenues (bln. CZK) 13.6 7.9 33.2/3.1
Wages (bln. CZK) 0.82 0.47 2.31/0.22
Costs of material (bln. CZK) 1.4 0.9 4.4/0.4
Costs of purchased products (bln. CZK) 8.6 5.5 26.4/1.9
Number of stores 57.6 56.2 220/5
Size of stores (bln. CZK) 0.64 0.74 3.07/0.08
Market share (%) 3.53 2.08 8.35/0.71
Number of employees 3608.6 2638.8 13000/230  
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In particular, the revenues of the average retailer in the period 2000–2005 amounted to 
CZK 13.6 billion, although there were quite significant differences between the retail chains (std. 
dev. of CZK 7.9 billion). Naturally, wages and the costs of material and purchased products vary 
across retail chains quite significantly. The average retail chain operates approximately 58 stores 
of a size of CZK 0.64 billion, employs roughly 3,609 employees, and supplies to 3.53% of the 
market for retailed products. The low value and especially the low volatility in market shares 
across retailer chains (std. dev. of 2%) suggests that the market is not yet settled, as this is very 
unusual by international standards (in the UK, for instance, the largest four chains in 2000 served 
71.2% of the market, according to Smith, 2004).  
5. Estimation Results  
In Table 3, we present the results for the downstream and upstream market power tests, i.e., the 
estimation results for (3.1.2) and (3.2.1), respectively. These were derived using the fixed effects 
IV estimator (due to endogeneity of revenues and the cost of purchased products), since, as 
follows from the presented Hausman tests in both cases, the fixed effects estimator was favored 
(at the 1% significance level) over the random effects model. Lagged values of the instrumented 
variables and the remaining independent variables in the respective regressions were used as 
instruments.
5 
The results of the test for equivalence of the price and volume data in regression 3.1.2 can be 
found in the Downstream column. As follows from the results, the assumption of homogeneity of 
revenues in quantity (tested by 3.1.3) cannot be rejected at conventional significance levels (p-
value of 0.13).   
Starting with the downstream market power test (see the Downstream column in Table 3), input 
costs are responsible for a large portion of the variation in revenues, but some part is still 
explained by market structure. Thus, the market is found to have a monopolistic structure. In 
particular, the elasticity to average input prices and, more precisely, the Rosse-Panzar statistic 
(0.91 and 0.88, respectively) are significantly distant from unity (the perfect competition case) and 
thus indicate imperfect (monopolistic) competition.  
The Rosse-Panzar statistic computed using (3.1.3) is very close to the elasticity to input prices, 
which is confirmed by the test for homogeneity of revenues in quantity. This implies that a change 
in quantity on the right-hand side does imply a change of the same magnitude on the left-hand 
side. Therefore, the relation between revenues and average input prices remains unaffected by 





                                                           
5 The results are robust to the exclusion of Macro Cash & Carry – a specific chain that operates wholesale-type 
stores in large cities, but nevertheless has a significant market share.   12   Jiří Podpiera and Marie Raková 
 
Table 3: Results of Fixed Effects IV Estimation 
Downstream Upstream
ln(Revenues) ln(Cost of purchased products)
Intercept (avg. of fixed eff.) 3.7***(0.76) 7.42***(2.68)
ln(Cost of purchased products) 0.56***(0.04) -
ln(Personal costs) 0.14***(0.03) -




ln(ER: CZK/EUR) - 0.16(0.16)
R
2-overall 0.99 0.88
Baltagi-Wu LBI 2.08 2.04
Modif. Bhargawa et al. D.W. 1.41 1.25
Hausman test: fixed vs. random eff. χ
2(5) = 13.95**(p-value: 0.016) χ
2(4) = 15.73***(p-value: 0.003)
σe/ρ 0.01/0.97 0.04/0.97
Obs./Retailers 55/13 55/13
Obs per retailer (min/avg/max) 2/4.2/6 2/4.2/6
Elasticity to input prices 0.91***(0.03) -
Rosse-Panzar statistic 0.88***(0.06) -
Homogeneity of revenues in quantity -0.04(0.03); p-value: 0.13 -
χ-θ - -0.16***(0.04)
φ+θ - 1.09***(0.03)  
Note: Standard errors are presented in parenthesis; Stars denote significance level as follows: ***1%; 
**5%; *10%.   
 
The average mark-up across retail chains is 3.7%, which is quite an intuitive margin considering 
the area of retail – fast-moving consumer products. At the same time, however, market share 
played an important role in securing additional mark-up. An increase in market share by 1% 
yields a supplementary mark-up of 0.15%. This is unambiguously a result of downstream market 
power. On the other side, a 1% increase in the number of stores within a retail chain causes the 
mark-up to drop by 0.04%. Obviously, the retailer trades a drop in mark-up for a future benefit 
from an increase in market share (i.e., a benefit that is three times bigger) and thus by opening 
new stores pays the cost in the form of a decrease in its profit margin. 
Turning to the upstream (see the Upstream column in Table 3), the autonomous size of costs of 
purchased products of 7.5 percent is further altered by market share, number of firms, and size of 
shops in the retail chain. Most interestingly, however, as can be seen from the last two rows in the 
table, a 1% increase in the number of stores permits the execution of upstream market power by 
the retailer and decreases the price of purchased products on average by 0.16%. This is related to 
the fact that an increase in the number of retail shops allows suppression of prices of purchased 
products by the retailer, who offers the benefit of accessing a larger market to the intermediate 
supplier. On the other side, an increase in sales and market share leads to an increase in the price 
of purchased products. This is also quite intuitive, since an increase in the demand for a product 
will result in an increase in the price of the product upstream. And finally, despite its statistical 
insignificance (probably due to the high price elasticity of purchased products: the import price 
elasticity of foods – meat, carbohydrates, fruit and vegetables, dairy products, and confectionery – 
in the Czech Republic is equal to -0.88, according to a study by Janda et al., 2000), the sign of the The Price Effects of an Emerging Retail Market   13 
 
effect of the exchange rate is in line with intuition – an appreciation of the Czech koruna lowers 
the costs of purchased products. 
Combining both downstream and upstream market power, one can make an inference about the 
development of final consumer prices in the market supplied by the retail chains. In particular, a 
1% increase in market share causes an increase in mark-up of 0.15% (see Table 3; ln(NMKTS) in 
the downstream eq.), and since it also causes an increase in the price of products purchased by the 
retailer of 0.05% (an increase in the price of purchased products of 0.09% (parameters φ+θ) due to 
a 1% increase in demand for suppliers’ products, which translates to a consumer price increase of 
0.56%), the total effect on price growth is 0.2%.  
Similarly, a 1% increase in the number of stores leads upstream to prices of purchased products 
being pushed down by 0.09% (a 1% increase in the retailer’s number of stores lowers its price of 
purchased products by 0.16% (parameters χ+θ), which translates to consumer prices to the extent 
of 0.56%). At the same time, the mark-up is lowered downstream by 0.04% in response to a 1% 
increase in the retailer’s number of stores. Thus, the effect on prices in retail shops is a decrease of 
0.13%. 
In our sample period, i.e. 2000 to 2005, the average change in yearly market share for the average 
retail chain was 3.26%, while the number of stores increased by 11.3%. Using the estimated 
coefficients for upstream and downstream market power derived above, we conclude that there 
was a negative (-0.8 p.p. a year) market structure effect on prices of retailed products during our 
sample period.    
Given that the effect of downstream market power was dominated by the effect of upstream 
market power in the period of retail chain expansion, one might speculate that potential further 
concentration will take place via mergers and acquisitions (as the latest developments already 
suggest: four acquisitions between 2004 and 2008). In such case, the effect of downstream market 
power would dominate and prices of retailed products would inflate. Thus, if the Czech retail 
market were to gradually approach the standard of 3–4 retail chains (three chains currently operate 
in Austria’s retail market, which is of comparable size to the Czech one; the four largest retailers 
in the UK serve more than 70% of the market; and there are 11 chains in Germany, serving a retail 
market that is nearly eight times larger than the Czech one) over the next ten years, the average 
extra yearly inflation of consumer prices of retailed products due to the changing market structure 
would be equal to 1.2 p.p.
6 (a 100% increase in the market share of four chains, with no additional 
stores being built, serving 60% of the total market for retailed products), which is equivalent to a 
0.5 p.p. increase in the CPI.  
                                                           
6 This is also roughly in line with the tendency toward elimination of the significantly lower trade margins in the 
Czech retail business (by approximately 15% in 2002) as compared to Germany and Austria, as reported in a 
study by Král et al. (2005).  14   Jiří Podpiera and Marie Raková 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper we have investigated the effect of changing market structure on the prices of retailed 
products in an emerging retail market. In particular, we have evaluated the size of the downstream 
and upstream market power of retailers during 2000–2005 in the Czech Republic. Our findings 
suggest that downstream market power was dominated by upstream market power and thus the 
prices of retailed products declined, on average by 0.8 p.p. a year (2000–2005). At the same time, 
the tendency toward mergers and acquisitions of retail chains, which had already started in 2004, 
gradually leading toward a more standard ratio of number of retailers to market size – as observed 
in Western countries, would cause average extra inflation of consumer prices of retailed goods of 
1.2 p.p. (approximately 0.5 p.p. in the CPI) a year over the next ten years.    
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